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Introduction
 Highly abstract concepts in bills of 
rights in Westminster-style legal 
systems in Asia.
 No person shall be deprived of “personal 
liberty save in accordance with law”.
 Every person is entitled to “equal 
protection of the law”.
 At some stage the constitutional text 
‘runs out’ – it stops providing a court 
with much guidance on how 
fundamental liberties should be 
applied to specific cases.
Introduction
 Singapore Constitution, Art 9(1): “No 
person shall be deprived of his… personal 
liberty save in accordance with law.”
 Semantic meaning of the sentence is quite 
clear.
 But does knowing this help a judge decide 
if a statute criminalizing abetment of 
suicide infringes the right to personal 
liberty of a terminally-ill person who needs 
someone to help him end his life which he 
finds intolerable?
Introduction
 It is still the court’s duty to 
figure out what the text means 
to determine the dispute.
 The judge must engage in 
constitutional construction – the 
process of articulating rules of 
constitutional law when 
attempts to interpret the 
language of the text yield no 
further insights.
Introduction
 Interpretation – Process of identifying 
the semantic content of the constitutional 
text (what it means linguistically). But 
semantic content does not fully determine 
the content of constitutional law; it only 
contributes towards it.
 Construction – Process by which judges 
transform semantic meaning of the text 
into legal rules. If semantic meaning is 
clear, little construction is required. But if 
it is not clear, then court will have to apply 
legal rules and principles to determine 
what the relevant constitutional rule is.
Introduction
Preliminary look at strategies of 
constitutional construction:
 The presumption of generosity.
 Constitutional implications.
 Proportionality analysis.
2The Presumption in Favour
of Generosity
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Generosity
 Constitutions and bills of rights 
qualitatively different from ordinary 
statutes.
 Drafted in broad terms as they are 
intended to remain in force 
unchanged for long periods and 
apply to situations not contemplated 
by framers.
 Must be interpreted differently from 
ordinary statutes.
Generosity
“[I]t must always be remembered that we are 
interpreting a Constitution broad and general in 
its terms, intended to apply to the varying 
conditions which the development of our 
community must involve.
“For that reason, where the question is whether 
the Constitution has used an expression in the 
wider or in the narrower sense, the Court should, 
in my opinion, always lean to the broader 
interpretation unless there is something in the 
context or in the rest of the Constitution to 
indicate that the narrower interpretation will best 
carry out its object and purpose.”
Jumbunna Coal Mine NL v Victorian Coal Miners’
Association (1908) 6 CLR 309 at 367–368
Generosity
 Application of the principle that courts will 
not interpret a statute to abrogate rights 
unless this is clear and unambiguous.
 Understanding shared by government and 
people that fundamental liberties are 
central to individual contentment and 
fulfilment within society, and to democracy 
and the rule of law.
 If government wishes to restrict the ambit 
of rights, it must seek to amend the 
constitutional text so the matter can be 
debated by the legislature.
Generosity
 Practical implication of the 
presumption: courts should 
come down in favour of 
expanding rather than 
contracting rights.
 Where other factors evenly 
balanced, presumption in favour 
of generosity may be decisive.
Constitutional Implications
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 Ambiguity v vagueness:
 Ambiguity – Two or more different and 
specific constructions can be given to 
the text, and one cannot dispel the 
semantic uncertainty by considering the 
context.
 Vagueness – Language of text is so 
broad that it is capable of a range of 
meanings, some of which may be 
mutually inconsistent.
Implications
 Ambiguity is inadvertent; 
vagueness is intentional.
Many words and phrases of the Australian 
Constitution “are expressed at such a level of 
generality that the most sensible conclusion to 
be drawn from their use in a Constitution is 
that the makers of the Constitution intended 
that they should apply to whatever facts and 
circumstances succeeding generations thought 
they covered”.
Re Wakim, ex parte McNally (1999) 198 CLR 511
at 552, [44], HC (Aust) per McHugh J
Implications
 Implications from text and 
structure of the constitution.
 Implications from fundamental 
common law principles.
Implications:
Text and Structure
 What implications are to be drawn from 
text? Court must, of course, take into 
account all relevant factors, including:
 the provision in question and related 
provisions; and
 other parts of the constitution (including the 
history of its enactment).
 Based on well-established principle that a 
provision must be construed in the light of 
the statute in which it is found.
Implications:
Text and Structure
Liyanage v The Queen [1967] 1 AC 259, PC (on appeal from 
Ceylon):
 Ceylon Constitution did not contain any provision 
expressly vesting judicial power in the courts.
 But it could be inferred that judicial power was not to 
pass to or be exercisable by the executive or legislative 
branch of government because:
 Judicial power in judiciary’s hands for more than a century 
before the new Constitution came into force.
 Clauses of Constitution indicated that political branches of 
government were not to interfere with the judiciary. Judges 
to be appointed by a Judicial Service Commission, which 
legislators were barred from being members of. Attempt to 
influence any decision of the Commission was a criminal 
offence. Judges could not be removed from office except by 
the Governor-General on an address of both the Senate and 
House of Representatives. 
Implications:
Text and Structure
 High Court of Australia has implied rights into the 
Constitution based on its text and structure.
 Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation
(1997) 189 CLR 520 – “Freedom of communication 
on matters of government and politics” can be 
inferred from the form of “representative and 
responsible government” that is indicated by 
various constitutional provisions requiring members 
of the Senate and House of Representatives to be 
chosen by the people of the States and the 
Commonwealth respectively by way of periodic 
direct elections.
 Some judges have accepted existence of implied 
freedoms of association and movement, and implied 
right to legal equality (the latter has been expressly 
rejected by a majority of the Court).
4Implications:
Text and Structure
Some conclusions:
 Implications must be based on text and structure, 
but may be indirect.
If freedom of political communication exists 
between citizens and elected representatives, and 
between citizen and citizen, then there must be 
freedom to associate. And freedom of association 
necessarily entails freedom of movement.
 No implication in the face of inconsistent provisions.
Most judges of the Australian High Court have 
rejected existence of implied right to legal equality 
because Constitution allows Commonwealth 
Parliament to pass laws discriminating in favour of 
or against aliens, and benefiting or discriminating 
against the people of any race.
Implications:
Text and Structure
 More stringent standard for implications from 
structure than from text?
Australian Capital Television Pty Ltd v 
Commonwealth (1992) 177 CLR 106 at 135:
 Where implication is from the actual terms of the 
Constitution, it is enough that accepted principles of 
interpretation suggest an implication should be made.
 However, where the implication is structural, the term 
to be implied must be logically or practically 
necessary for the preservation of the integrity of that 
structure.
Stricter standard is necessary for implications from 
structure because the text does not really constrain 
the courts’ discretion.
Implications:
Text and Structure
 Once implications drawn, judges will need to 
look to principles and values external to the 
text and structure to flesh out consequences of 
implications in particular cases.
After High Court of Australia identified freedom 
of political communication in the Constitution, 
it had to determine what standard of review to 
apply to it. Some cases applied proportionality 
analysis, others a two-tiered review approach.
The constitutional text does not indicate which 
approach is more appropriate. Instead, court 
must refer to values underlying the freedom of 
political communication.
Implications:
Common Law
 Parliament does not legislate in 
a vacuum. Constitution must be 
read in the light of existing 
statutory and common law 
rules.
 Can a court declare that some 
common law rules are so 
fundamental that they have 
constitutional status?
Implications:
Common Law
 Taylor v New Zealand Poultry Board [1984] 
1 NZLR 394 at 398, CA (NZ) – Cooke J 
commented obiter that “[s]ome common law 
rights presumably lie so deep that even 
Parliament could not override them”, and 
suggested it would be beyond Parliament’s 
lawful powers to compel a person to answer 
questions using torture. (Similar suggestions in 
R (Jackson) v Attorney General [2006] 1 AC 
262, HL.)
 Ong Ah Chuan v PP [1979–1980] SLR(R) 
710, PC (on appeal from S’pore) – Law in the 
Constitution includes fundamental rules of 
natural justice. Court incorporated common 
law rules into the constitutional text.
Implications:
Common Law
 Contrast other cases – it is 
merely presumed that 
Parliament does not intend to 
“overthrow fundamental 
principles, infringe rights, or 
depart from the general system 
of law, without expressing its 
intention with irresistible 
clearness”: Jackson at [159]; 
Potter v Minahan (1908) 7 CLR 
277 at 304, HC (Aust).
5Proportionality Analysis
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Proportionality
 Court will probably need to refer to 
extratextual principles and values when 
determining nature and scope of 
constitutional implications.
 Also necessary when court is faced with an 
undefined term or provision. If semantic 
meaning of term in context of provision is 
not helpful, court will have to construct a 
meaning according to its own best 
understanding of the text and its objective, 
in the light of extratextual values 
supporting the concepts embodied in the 
text.
Proportionality
 Concern expressed about US 
Supreme Court giving “apparently 
limitless reading[s]” of vague terms 
such as “life, liberty and property” in 
the 14th Amendment to US 
Constitution, as this “portend[s] a 
debasement of the currency of 
‘rights’ insofar as any political claim 
can be couched as a right, to 
insulate it from political contestation”
(Thio Li-ann, 2010).
Proportionality
 But courts’ responsibility is to figure out 
the meaning of the constitutional text and 
apply it to factual scenarios.
 Fact that framers of the text have chosen 
highly abstract terms such as equality and 
liberty shows they expected the courts to 
articulate the implications of these 
concepts in specific cases.
 Reasonable to assume that judges 
expected to have discretion to consider 
relevant legal principles and values lying 
outside the text.
Proportionality
 Not much point in courts trying 
to determine whether a 
fundamental liberty is wide 
enough to cover a particular 
activity.
 So long as the activity plausibly 
falls within the scope of the 
right, the court is better off 
focusing on a proportionality 
analysis.
Proportionality
de Freitas v Permanent Secretary of Ministry of 
Agriculture, Fisheries, Lands and Housing
[1999] 1 AC 69, PC (on appeal from Antigua 
and Barbuda):
 Is the legislative objective of the impugned 
statute sufficiently important to justify limiting 
a fundamental right?
 Are measures designed to meet the legislative 
objective rationally connected to it?
 Are means used to impair the right or freedom 
no more than is necessary to accomplish the 
objective?
6Conclusion
When courts are carrying out constitu-
tional construction, they will be 
guided by:
 Presumption of generosity –
especially important in cases of 
doubt.
 Discretion to draw implications 
from text, structure and (maybe) 
common law – note the need to 
consider extratextual principles and 
values.
 Proportionality.
Conclusion
Too much discretion to undemocratic judges?
 Idea behind constitutional judicial review –
an institution independent of the political 
branches should decide what fundamental 
liberties the people (especially minorities) 
enjoy.
 Democracy not just majority rule. Must 
recognize minority interests too.
 Judiciary in dialogue with Executive and 
Legislature.
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